The UK in a Changing Europe initiative, led by Professor Anand Menon of King’s College London, has produced a report describing some of the possible impacts of a “no deal” scenario. The authors adopt the term “chaotic Brexit” as a means to distinguish a failed negotiation, with no reciprocal agreement at the end of the talks, from the more familiar term “hard Brexit”, which broadly denotes a withdrawal agreement that would see the UK revert to trading with the EU27 (and, presumably, the rest of the world) on WTO-only terms.
The impact of failing to reach a deal with the EU would be, the report says, “widespread, damaging and pervasive”. What is notably absent, however, are any suggestions for how the UK government could mitigate or avoid such an outcome, and that, I would have thought, is where these experts could be providing real value. Not by telling us what must be done, but by narrowing what Bill Seddon calls the “plausibility scope”, in order that we might understand our options more clearly.
Just how damaging a “no deal” scenario would be has been explored on EUReferendum.com from a variety of angles since the “leave” vote. To my way of thinking, much of this is raking over old ground, the situation now is rather more urgent. What would be useful are possible solutions.
Then, as I read through the section about the impact of a “no deal” scenario on the agricultural industry, a thought which I had been struggling to concretise came together. Most academics are not practitioners. As such, they are (necessarily) reactive, rather than pro-active. They’re looking at what others (politicians and policy-makers in the civil service) are doing and trying to understand it, much like the rest of us.
Are they also expecting a steer from government, rather than thinking that maybe the impetus ought to be the other way around?
This short section made that idea loom even larger:
This means that some kind of transitional arrangements will almost certainly be necessary. These might allow the maintenance of trade with the EU on something like current terms, while the details and practicalities of any long term deal are thrashed out. But here again nothing will be simple. There is little prospect that the EU27 will allow this unless we agree to the continuation of free movement of people and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice during any transitional period.
The notion that two-years is too short a time to agree a new relationship with the EU will be familiar to anybody who has visited this blog over the past year. The part that really stood out, however, was the assertion that there is little prospect of the remaining EU Member States agreeing to any transitional arrangements that do not involve free movement of people and the jurisdiction of the ECJ.
That appears to ignore the existence of EFTA and the two-pillar EEA agreement, which uses the EFTA Court as an arbitration and dispute resolution mechanism. Is this an oversight on the part of the authors or are they unaware of the fact that there are states which participate in the Single Market without also being in the EU?
Given that the ECJ does not claim jurisdiction over any territory outside of the EU Member States, it strikes most people as untenable that this avowedly political court could retain such powers in the UK even after EU withdrawal. The EFTA Court, by contrast, is a viable alternative to the ECJ, the kind of pragmatic compromise that could pave the way to a deal both sides can accept.
This is an important piece of information, which should be more widely communicated and understood. Yet this report’s choice of words could be used to reaffirm the all-too-familiar narrative that would have us believe continuity ECJ is the UK’s only option over the short- to medium-term. It is all very well to present us with problems, but I would expect subject matter experts to be willing and able to offer creative solutions too.
Neither, given the sensitivity of the subject matter, do I think calls for greater attention to detail are unwarranted. Which brings me to my final piece of constructive criticism.
The leading academics who produced this report purport to provide readers with unbiased commentary and objective information. With that in mind, why then does their report include rejoinders such as this:
As for UK nationals living, working and providing services in the EU, so long as the UK remains a member they will continue to enjoy EU rights. But for how long will the EU tolerate UK nationals enjoying the rights of EU law in their countries when the UK has made it so clear that it wishes to turn its back on the EU?
Why is leaving the EU here characterised as Britain turning its back on the EU? Why not say, “leaving the EU” or “withdrawing from the EU”? I doubt whether such a turn of phrase would find its way into any of the author’s academic papers, so why adopt this emotive tone when writing for a general audience? By the same token, in what sense does the EU following its own rules require tolerating UK nationals? The EU is a rules-based organisation, tolerance does not enter into it.
Language matters and if you’re going to effect the position of one who is objective, it matters that you adopt a neutral and descriptive lexicon, which does not prejudice how readers interpret your arguments or assertions.
It’s odd to feel like the professor marking a capable student’s coursework, when the report is the work of experts and I am just an interested observer, but that is how it is. As was sometimes written on some of my earlier efforts, “You’ve made a start, where is the rest?”.